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In this paper, we explore the role of trade in differentiated final goods as well offshoring of 
tasks for inequality both within and between countries. We emphasize the distinction between 
managerial and production labor. Production labor is assumed to be a variable input 
composed of tradable tasks, while managerial labor is a fixed, non-tradable input. We use a 2-
country model recently developed by Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg (2010b) that highlights 
trade in production task, driven by Marshallian economies of scale. We analyze country size 
and relative endowment effects on the managerial wage premium as well as on international 
inequality measured in income per head. We compare these effects in a world where trade is 
restricted to differentiated final goods with a world with trade in both final goods and 
production tasks. 
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December 2010 1 Introduction
There is a widespread presumption that, other things equal, larger countries should
pay higher wages. The underlying assumption is that, in one form or another, many
industries feature advantages of large scale production, which should be reﬂected in
higher equilibrium factor rewards in larger countries. However, other things are seldom
equal. In particular, many people still prefer to live in small countries, where their
speciﬁc abilities are scarce, relative to other types of labor and relative to capital or
land. In other words, in general equilibrium wages for diﬀerent types of labor are
governed by both, a country’s size and its relative labor endowment. In this paper,
we draw on a recent contribution by Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg (2010b), in order
to explore the interaction of country size and relative endowment eﬀects on inequality
both within and between countries, using a 2-country model that highlights trade in
diﬀerentiated ﬁnal goods as well as trade in tasks driven by economies of scale.
Theory tells us that the way in which country size and relative endowments translate
into a certain pattern of wages or, more generally, factor prices crucially depends on
how these countries are connected to each other through trade and factor movements.
For instance, models of comparative advantage stress that cross-country diﬀerences in
relative factor endowments have a very limited role to play for national wages, if there
is free trade between countries. Indeed, the factor price equalization theorem of the
Heckscher-Ohlin model tells us that under certain conditions they play no role at all.
This is sometimes called the “endowment insensitivity” of factor prices. However, there
are multiple reasons why, even within the conﬁnes of this theory, a country’s relative
endowment regains importance for its factor prices. Perhaps the most relevant case in
point is insuﬃcient diversiﬁcation of a country’s production, as highlighted in Dixit &
Norman (1980).
If trade renders national endowment irrelevant for national wages, it seems tempting
to view a country’s trade exposure as a potential explanatory factor for its trends in
inequality. However, establishing the empirical signiﬁcance of trade as an explanatory
factor for observed wage patterns over time has been notoriously diﬃcult.1 From a
trade theory perspective, perhaps the most important caveat to bear in mind is that
factor remunerations are primarily determined by traded goods prices, and not by the
volume and the factor content of trade per se.2 Some authors have argued that trade in
intermediate inputs, or oﬀshoring, is a more convincing explanatory candidate for the
rising skill premium than trade in ﬁnal goods.3 However, recent theoretical treatments
have shown that under very plausible conditions oﬀshoring of production components
1See Krugman (1995) for an early critique. For recent review of the evidence see Lawrence (2008).
2See the discussion in Deardorﬀ (2000), Krugman (2000), Leamer (2000), and Panagariya (2000).
3See Feenstra & Hanson (1997, 1999, 2003) and Krugman (2008). Based on a version of the
traditional model that is similar to Feenstra & Hanson (1997), Treﬂer & Zhu (2005) show that catching-
up of less developed countries may entail a systematic eﬀect towards increasing their skill premium.
1or labor services to more labor abundant countries with lower wages may well lower,
rather than increase, the domestic skill premium.4
If traditional endowment-based models fail to fully explain what we observe, where
should we look for alternative, or complementary explanations? Models that focus
on scarcity premia and trade to explain wage inequality, almost be deﬁnition, have a
“north-south” ﬂavor; the focus squarely lies on trade between countries with diﬀerent
relative endowments. Yet, a lot of the more recent increase in world trade has taken
place in “north-north” direction, i.e., trade between countries with similar relative en-
dowments. Almost any credible explanation of such trade will incorporate one form
or another of economies of large scale production. And with economies of scale, one
expects country size to play a role, in addition to relative endowments.
The modern view of trade incorporates two forms of scale economies. Production
of intermediates is assumed to to involve a ﬁxed cost. This means scale economies
that are internal to the ﬁrm, which requires departing from the assumption of per-
fect competition. The literature mostly assumes monopolistic competition. A larger
resource base allows exploitation of these economies, leading to a larger variety and
lower prices of intermediate inputs. In ﬁnal goods production, this is felt as higher
productivity of primary inputs; see Ethier (1982b). But this eﬀect is clearly external to
the individual ﬁrm which may well perceive a technology with constant returns to scale.
Notice, however, that with free trade in intermediates such external scale economies
are international in scope; see Ethier (1979).
Perhaps surprisingly, an important conclusion to be derived from this view of tech-
nology and trade is that country size should not play a role for wages paid in any one
country. However, it regains importance as a determinant of wages once we assume,
plausibly, that trade is costly. Workers in large countries will then see a lower share
of their consumption basket inﬂated through trade-cost and will thus enjoy higher real
wages. This is the well-known “home market eﬀect” in the presence of monopolistic
competition, ﬁrst pointed out by Krugman (1980). A similar eﬀect obtains for ﬁnal
goods producers using diﬀerentiated traded intermediate inputs. Models of new eco-
nomic geography incorporate this mechanism as a force of agglomeration; see Fujita
et al. (2001).
Costliness of trade re-establishes some relevance of country size where scale economies
external to the ﬁrm are inherently international in scope arise, due to pecuniary exter-
nalities transmitted through tradable goods. Very often, however, economies of scale
are based on non-pecuniary spill-over mechanisms that require regional concentration,
hence they will be national in scope to start with. Such external, but national scale
economies (so-called “Marshallian” scale economies) have long been recognized as a po-
tentially important source of specialization and trade. But they constitute a somewhat
awkward case, because they entail a potential of multiple trading equilibria, driven by
4See Kohler (2004) and Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg (2008).
2arbitrary, but self-fulﬁlling expectations that each ﬁrm may have about other ﬁrms’ be-
havior; see Matsuyama (1991) and Krugman (1991). Moreover, as pointed out long ago
by Graham (1923), trade based on this form of scale economies need not be beneﬁcial
to all countries, even under otherwise ideal conditions, since scale eﬀects are an exter-
nality; see Ethier (1982b). For these reasons, external scale economies of this kind have
taken somewhat of a back seat in the evolution of trade theory. However, in a recent
paper Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg (2010a) show that the scope for multiple equilibria
with “Marshallian” scale economies is substantially reduced, if ﬁrms are not assumed to
be atomistic. If they are assumed, instead, to correctly anticipate the discrete output
and productivity eﬀects of setting out-of-equilibrium prices, then the pattern of trade
is no longer indeterminate, but driven by underlying comparative advantage.
Our treatment of inequality in this paper deviates in two important ways from
existing literature. The ﬁrst relates to endowment-based models that typically draw
a line between high- and low-skilled labor, thus discussing income inequality in terms
of skill premia.5 We argue that this distinction has very limited meaning, unless we
explicitly model skill formation. We do acknowledge that there is a sizable body of liter-
ature dealing with skill formation; for instance, see for instance Findlay & Kierzkowski
(1983) and Kreickemeier (2009). But the skill-focus tends to obfuscate another dis-
tinction that we argue is of equal, or even greater, importance, viz. the distinction
between managerial and production labor. For want of skill-oriented data, researchers
have often resorted to this dimension in lieu of the skill dimension when attempting
to measure employment or wages; see for instance Feenstra (2010). But it is all too
obvious that a lot of production work involves a high level of skills and human capital,
very often exceeding that of non-production work. In this paper, we take this to the
extreme by attaching a diﬀerent meaning to the distinction between managerial and
production labor that is orthogonal to the skill dimension.6
Assuming away all skill diﬀerences, what makes managerial labor a diﬀerent input
from production labor? We follow Rosen (1982) who argues that managerial activities
are often characterized by inherent indivisibility and scale economies.7 We model this
in a very simple way by deﬁning managerial labor to be a ﬁxed input. In contrast, pro-
duction activities are modeled as representing a variable input. This constitutes second,
5See Lawrence (2008) and Krugman (2008) for recent examples.
6We do not rule out that management is associated with task that require more skills or education
than production tasks. But it is not a key ingredient of our story. For this reason, our approach
also picks up, to some extent at least, the concern raised in recent public debates about managerial
incomes not reﬂecting educational premia.
7In Rosen’s own words: “Management involves discrete and indivisible choices and commands, such
as which goods to produce, in what varieties and volume, and how to produce them. Supervision insures
that management directives are carried through at the production level. Indivisibilities inherent in
management decisions are represented analytically as a form of total factor productivity improvement
and, as such, imply a strong scale economy, not unlike a public good but limited to the conﬁnes of
the ﬁrm. For example, the decision of which good to produce is largely independent of scale, applying
equally well to a very large enterprise as to a very small one.” (Rosen, 1982, p. 312).
3somewhat subtle deviation from the literature. Trade models featuring monopolistic
competition typically assume what Horn (1983) has called a homothetic technology,
meaning that the ﬁxed and variable inputs of a production process rely on the same
aggregate of primary factors. This seems at odds with the presence of managerial in-
put as a factor of production, and it substantially reduces the role of country size for
explaining inequality. Indeed, in assuming a single type of input, most of the “new”
trade theory focusing on scale economies is completely silent about inequality.
The ﬁxed managerial input represents the ability to organize and monitor an entire
production process that leads to a certain diﬀerentiated good. It is thus internal
to the ﬁrm. The variable input, on the other hand, requires expertise to perform a
potentially large number of diﬀerent activities dictated by complex value added chains.
This expertise often relates to narrowly deﬁned tasks, rather than the entire production
process. Moreover, such expertise arguably develops through concentration of certain
tasks in certain regions or countries, and not through the scale of ﬁrms as such. In
other words, production work as a variable input is likely to exhibit economies of scale
that are a) external to the ﬁrm, b) are likely to be national in scope, and c) are arising
at the level of numerous individual tasks.
Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg (2010b) therefore assume that, other things equal,
a unit of a country’s production labor is the more eﬃcient in performing a certain
task, the more often that task is performed within the country, independently of ﬁrm
size. They explore the potential of trade in tasks between two similar countries, similar
meaning that they share the same ratio of managerial and production labor endowment.
They trace out the role of relative country size for the structure of trade in tasks driven
by “Marshallian” economies of scale at the level of single tasks, and for the associated
levels of wages for production workers in one country relative to the other. They
conduct comparative static analysis over the general costliness of task trade (always
assuming that ﬁnal goods trade is costless), as well as over the degree of external scale
economies and the degree of product diﬀerentiation in ﬁnal goods. Given the lack of a
full closed form closed solution, they also rely on numerical simulations.
In this paper, we extend the model developed by Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg
(2010b) in allowing for trade in tasks to be driven by relative endowment diﬀerences as
well as country size. Moreover, in addition to cross country comparisons of production
wages, we also address within-country inequality in terms of the managerial wage
premium as well as international inequality in terms of income per capita. A detailed
analysis of the inﬂuence of country size and relative endowments on these measures of
inequality should enhance our understanding of the perennial issue of “trade and wages”
as well as the issue of “international convergence and globalization”. As in Grossman &
Rossi-Hansberg (2010b), we assume exogenous country endowments with managerial
and production labor.
There are three recent papers that have addressed issues of inequality along lines
4similar to what we do in this paper. Motivated by arguably unconvincing explanations
of trends to higher inequality within industrialized countries by traditional endowment-
based as well as scale-based models, Manasse & Turrini (2001) introduce a variant of the
Krugman (1980) model that, like that of Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg (2010b), departs
from homotheticity in technology. Speciﬁcally, they assume that the variable input (as
well as the incremental ﬁxed cost incurred to enter export markets) relies on “ raw”
labor, while the ﬁxed input is deﬁned in terms of managing skills. Managerial talent
translates into ﬁnal goods of higher quality, with an associated higher willingness to pay.
A key distinction to our approach is that in Manasse & Turrini (2001) each household
embodies both “raw” production work as well as managerial skills, whereby ﬁrm size
is exogenously ﬁxed to a single household. Thus, inequality does not arise between
production workers and managers, but between “raw” labor and managerial skills, both
embodied in the same individual. A key thrust of the analysis is a potentially convex
dependence of a household’s remuneration on the amount of her managerial skills,
which may explain the observed skewness in income distributions in many countries.
However, with a ﬁxed ﬁrm size it is obvious that this model is ill-suited to address
issues of country size.
In contrast, size eﬀects are at the heart of Epifani & Gancia (2008) who assume ex-
ternal scale economies that are international in scope along the lines of Ethier (1982a).
As in this paper, the interest lies in country size eﬀects on inequality within countries.
However, Epifani & Gancia (2008) stick to the distinction between high-skilled and
low-skilled workers, and they assume technology to be homothetic in the sense of Horn
(1983). It turns out that for a closed economy country size works in favor of high-skilled
labor, provided that i) the degree of external scale economies based on the variety ef-
fect is larger for the high-skill-intensive industry than the low-skill-intensive industry,
and ii) the elasticity of substitution in demand for the goods of the two industries is
larger than 1. For any given composition of the labor force, an increase in country size
increases income per capita, due to enhanced diﬀerentiation of intermediate inputs.
Under the aforementioned assumptions, the eﬀect is stronger for the skill-intensive in-
dustry, and income and substitution eﬀects do not oﬀset each other in demand. The
outcome then is a higher scarcity premium for high-skilled labor. And what is true for
a closed economy becoming larger is also true for two or many economies becoming
more integrated, whence all countries similarly reap the beneﬁts from serving a larger
(world) market. These are now doubt important insights, but for reasons mentioned
above the focus on skilled versus unskilled labor in a homothetic technology seems
questionable.
A recent paper by Egger & Kreickemeier (2008) shares our view that inequality
should also be addressed along the distinction between managerial as a ﬁxed input
and production labor as a variable input. As in Manasse & Turrini (2001), they as-
sume households to be diﬀerently endowed with innate managing abilities. However,
they assume that, instead of higher quality output, managerial talent delivers higher
5productivity of employed production labor. Moreover, at the stage of production the
managerial and production input, respectively, are delivered by distinct individuals,
although ex ante any household has the capacity to be either a manager or a worker.
Households select themselves into one or the other type of activity, based on expected
production wages and managerial income in the form of operating proﬁts. As a ﬁrm
owner, a manager needs to employ workers subject to a fair wage constraint, whereby
workers’ notion of fairness involves the desire to participate in the ﬁrm’s idiosyncratic
operating proﬁts, i.e., the income of the ﬁrm’s manager. This installs a mechanism of
compression between production and managerial wages, but this in turn comes at the
expense of unemployment as well as inequality within the group of otherwise identical
workers who end up being matched with diﬀerently talented managers. Importantly,
although Egger & Kreickemeier (2008) do assume ﬁnal goods production with diﬀer-
entiated intermediates, they rule out the above mentioned external economies of scale.
Among their conclusions they ﬁnd that trade may increase inequality, both within the
groups of managers and workers and between the two groups, at the same time as it
increases unemployment.
While all of these papers no doubt deliver interesting and relevant insights, we
believe that further important insights can be derived from the model of trade in
tasks developed by Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg (2010b). As we have argued above,
the type of “Marshallian” economies of scale highlighted by this model as a source of
specialization on the level of tasks is an important element of industrial reality, and such
scale economies are known from earlier literature to have important consequences for
international inequality. We therefore extend the analysis beyond Grossman & Rossi-
Hansberg (2010b) by focusing on domestic inequality and by allowing for trade to be
driven by diﬀerences in relative endowments in addition to country size. Although this
may appear like a minor extension, the challenge is non-trivial, given the analytical
diﬃculties posed by “Marshallian” economies of scale. We also highlight the diﬀerence
between a world where trade is restricted to ﬁnal goods and a world where ﬁnal goods
trade is accompanied by trade in tasks.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the key relationships of our
model and derives comparative statics of size and endowments for the benchmark case
of free trade in ﬁnal goods, but no trade in tasks. In section 3, we derive the equilibrium
conditions that govern trade in tasks. We discuss possible equilibrium locations of task
performance. Since there are multiple trading equilibria that defy analytical solution,
section 4 proceeds with a numerical treatment that sheds light on how “freeness of
task trade” aﬀects the interaction between country size and relative endowments in
determining managerial and production workers’ wages. Section 5 concludes the paper.
62 Trade in ﬁnal goods
We assume two countries (home and foreign), sharing identical preferences and technol-
ogy but diﬀering in their exogenous endowments with managerial labor and production
workers. Managerial labor endowment is denoted by M for the home country and by
M for the foreign country. Both types of labor are immobile across countries. The
supply of workers is denoted by L and L for the home and the foreign country. Pref-
erences feature “love of variety”, modeled as usual through a Dixit-Stiglitz-type utility
function for varieties of a single ﬁnal good. We assume varieties to be fully symmetric
in both, demand and production. Producing any variety requires hiring f managers
as a ﬁxed input. In addition to managerial input, production requires a continuum of
diﬀerent tasks, indexed by i 2 [0;1], to be performed by production workers. We use
a function z(i) to denote the amount of task i that needs to be performed per unit of
the ﬁnal good.
By deﬁnition, ﬁrms are headquartered in the country where they hire their man-
agers.8 We make no distinction between ﬁrms hiring managers and managers setting
up their own ﬁrm. In equilibrium, a manager must earn the same income, whether in
terms of entrepreneurial proﬁt, if self-employed, or through a perfect contract with a
ﬁrm. For simplicity, our entire argument will be framed in terms of managerial wages,
denoted by s and s for the home and the foreign economy. The equilibrium value of
managerial wages is determined by free entry and perfect competition for managers,
whence pure proﬁts are zero.
Given Dixit-Stiglitz preferences, producers of diﬀerentiated varieties have price-
setting power, and they charge a markup over marginal cost equal to =(   1) > 1,
where  > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between any two varieties of the good.9
Assuming free entry, the number of ﬁrms is given by
n = M=f and n
 = M
=f (1)
and competitive managerial wages denoted by s and s, are determined from the con-











where c and c are marginal cost from production workers employed by a ﬁrm head-
quartered in the home and the foreign economy, respectively, selling amounts x and
8As indicated in the introduction, this is a useful ﬁrst step. An obvious next step would be to allow
for managerial workers to be mobile across countries and to analyze potential agglomeration along
the lines of “new economic geography”.
9This assumes a negligible inﬂuence of a single ﬁrm’s pricing policy on the overall price index of
varieties, which implies a relatively large number of ﬁrms. We assume that the overall endowment of
M + M is suﬃciently large for a suﬃciently large number of ﬁrms.
7x of their respective ﬁnal-good-variety.10 We assume no trade costs for ﬁnal goods,
hence the total amounts sold by the two types of ﬁrms on the world market satisﬁes









Marginal costs c and c depend on wages for production workers, and on a ﬁrm’s
organization of production. Firms face given wage rates w and w for workers located
in the home and the foreign economy, respectively. We compare two trading arrange-
ments. With ﬁnal goods trade alone, a ﬁrm headquartered in the home economy must
draw exclusively on home production workers, and similarly for foreign ﬁrms. With
trade in tasks, a ﬁrm need not have all tasks performed in its headquarter-country, but
may freely decide to locate some of the tasks in the other country. It then becomes
a multinational ﬁrm in the sense of Helpman (1984). However, doing so involves an
additional cost which varies across tasks; see below.
We use 1=A(i) to denote the amount of labor needed per unit of task i, if performed
in the home economy. Analogously for the foreign economy. External economies of scale
imply that A(i) depends on the entire amount of task i performed domestically, which
we denote by X(i). Following Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg (2010b), we model external
scale economies in constant elasticity form, such that A(i) = A[X(i)] := [X(i)]
, with
0 <  < 1. By analogy, A(i) = [X(i)]
. Note that these scale economies, while
external to the ﬁrm, do not extend beyond country borders. They are national in
scope.
The external nature of scale economies in production tasks has two implications.
First, it is consistent with the assumption of perfect competition in an institutional
environment where individual tasks are performed at arms length through market
transactions. Secondly, if we allow for task trade (oﬀshoring), the equilibrium location
of tasks depends on ﬁrms’ beliefs about what other ﬁrms will do. From existing liter-
ature on external economies of scale, one would expect multiple equilibria; see Ethier
(1982b). This is true here as well. However, as shown by Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg
(2010b), if any one ﬁrm has the option of performing tasks for other ﬁrms at arms
length (outsourcing), then the scope for multiple equilibria is signiﬁcantly reduced.
We shall return to this below.
We deﬁne ~ c(w) as the unit cost function for a ﬁnal-good that arises for a ﬁrm
headquartered in the home country, if trade is possible only for ﬁnal goods, meaning
that the entire continuum of all tasks for all home ﬁrms (and only home ﬁrms) are
10Equations (2) follow from setting px   cx   sf = x[=(   1)   1]   sf = 0. This replaces the
zero-proﬁt condition found in conventional models of monopolistic competition.
















Notice that the entire amount of task i performance in the home economy is X(i) =
z(i)nx. Given our speciﬁcation of A[X(i)], the amount of production work on task i
that is required per unit of the ﬁnal good is equal to [z(i)]
1 
.
(nx). We now assume
that z(i) is uniform across the entire range of i, such that [z(i)]
1  = z. Moreover,
we assume that the entire amount of all tasks required per unit of the ﬁnal good is of
measure 1, meaning
R 1
0 zdi = 1. This leads to






Given these assumptions, w=A(nx) and w=A(nx) may also be interpreted as the cost
of performing a unit of any task, respectively, in the home and the foreign economy.
If trade is possible also for production tasks, then the minimum marginal cost in each
of the two countries depends on both wages, w and w, since each country potentially
has some of these tasks performed abroad. Instead of equations (4), we then have
relatively complex expressions involving endogenous sub-ranges of the task continuum
that represent central or decentralized task performance. More details will follow below.
Trade in ﬁnal goods implies that c = ~ c(w) = w/A(xn) and c = ~ c(w) =






































whereby the second equality in each line follows from the above assumption of externally
9increasing returns to scale.11 Replacing n = M=f and n = M=f from equilibrium
conditions (1) for the managerial labor market, we thus have 5 equilibrium conditions
to determine the equilibrium levels of four wage rates fw;w;s;sg and the two output
levels fx;xg.
Choosing the foreign wage rate as our numéraire, w = 1, we have s = [x=A(xn)]f=( 
1), and replacing x from the above labor market clearing conditions (1) and (8), we





M (   1)
(10)
Given w = 1, the home wage is governed by commodity market clearing (6), which
leads to w = (x=x) 1=(xn)(xn)  = (x=x) 1=(n=n). Taking into account equi-
librium in the two labor markets for production workers, x=x = (L=L)
1=(1 ) (n=n),










Substituting back into (10) gives s = w(nx)1 












which will be our measure to analyze within-country inequality. Additionally, we look
at cross-country inequality in terms of income per head in the home relative to the













where M = M=(M+L) is the share of managers in the home economy and equivalently
for all other shares. We are now in a position to explore the comparative statics of our
inequality measures.
11It is perhaps worth pointing out that these scale economies to not translate into scale economies
on the ﬁnal goods level. Final goods producers do not act under the belief that increasing their output
lowers marginal cost on account of a larger task performance. They take marginal cost c and c as
given parametrically.
10Size eﬀect: Remember that the two types of labor are in diﬀerent positions regarding
economies of scale. The scale eﬀect from the ﬁxed managerial input is internal to the
ﬁrms producing ﬁnal goods, while the scale economies in production tasks are external
to the ﬁrms specializing on certain tasks. This fundamental asymmetry notwithstand-
ing, the beneﬁt from a balanced increase in a country’s labor force trickles down in
equal proportions to both types of labor. The managerial and the production wage
increase by the same proportion. This is seen for the home and foreign economy from
(13) and (10), respectively. The managerial wage premium is independent of country
size and depends only on relative endowments.
Concerning the relative average wage things are quite clearly cut as well. Letting




   








The ﬁrst term is a negative terms of trade eﬀect. Even though both factors grow
at the same rate, output of each variety increases due to the economies of scale. The
higher output is absorbed by consumers only if accompanied by a decline in the relative
price of the domestic varieties. The second term is the direct eﬀect on productivity
which is clearly positive and larger than the ﬁrst term. The home economy therefore
unambiguously gains from a balanced growth. There are gains to make from being
large due to the economies of scale in the model.
Composition eﬀect: The wage eﬀects of unbalanced growth of the labor force are
less straightforward. Intuitively, other things equal, a larger size of the production
work force might be considered a good thing for the individual worker, since there are
external scale economies in the use of production work. At the same time, we would
not expect that managers should beneﬁt from a larger size of the managerial work
force, since the economies of scale involved in managerial input are internal to the ﬁrm
or manager. We ﬁrst perform comparative statics for an increase in the endowment
with managers.
The number of workers in each company has to be reduced in equilibrium. This
means less proﬁts and lower managerial salaries. Workers’ wages, on the other hand,




The intuition is quite straightforward. More managers raise the number of home ﬁrms
at the expense of lower ﬁrm output. However, with a constant production work force
L, the amount of aggregate output xn must remain constant; see (9). By complete
11analogy, we have d s=w = ^ L. From (12) we see that managerial labor participates in
the external scale economies deriving from more production labor. On the other hand,
while production workers clearly lose relative to managers, they might still gain in
absolute terms if scale economies are suﬃciently strong and substitutability between
varieties is suﬃciently; see (11).
The increased scarcity of each home variety, relative to foreign varieties, implies that
each home ﬁrm charges a higher price and, thus, pays a higher wage to its production
workers. The standard results prevail: A larger endowment with managers has a
negative own-eﬀect and a positive cross-eﬀect on wages.
The aggregate eﬀect of this change, however, is not clear ex ante. Performing










which is ambiguous. Since each domestic ﬁrm now has lower output, market clearing
implies a higher price of domestic varieties, depending on the elasticity of substitution.
This constitutes a terms of trade improvement which works against the foreign economy
in this income comparison. At the same time, each manager now employs less workers
which reduces the salary he can residually claim. This works against domestic income
per head, in line with the share of managers in the domestic labor force.
The price eﬀect from (13) lowers domestic income per head in line with the share of
managers in the domestic labor force in the second term of (17). The ﬁrst term captures
a quantity eﬀect depending on . More managers means more ﬁrms, but lower output
per ﬁrm which is absorbed through a price increase which is the larger the lower .
An increase in domestic managerial labor endowment thus generates a terms of trade
improvement for the domestic economy which may oﬀset the lower managerial incomes
in the international income comparison.













The ﬁrst term again indicates a terms of trade eﬀect, which is negative due to higher
output per ﬁrm and which is reinforced by a higher productivity due to external scale
economies. The negative eﬀect on the terms of trade is now more pronounced than in
the case of symmetric changes, since all new production workers are employed produc-
ing a constant number of varieties, whereas above the number of varieties was increased
as well. The second term captures the income eﬀect derived from higher productivity
which clearly dominates the terms of trade eﬀect. The ﬁnal term is readily interpreted
as the eﬀect on managers’ salary which now is positive, since each manager employs
12more production workers. We summarize these ﬁndings in two propositions as follows:
Proposition 1 (symmetric endowment changes). Countries increasing in size, with
the labor force composition unchanged, experience a rise in their income per capita
relative to the rest of the world. A negative terms of trade eﬀect is dominated by a
positive productivity eﬀect from external economies of scale in production labor.
Proposition 2 (asymmetric endowment changes). An asymmetric endowment in-
crease additionally entails a labor force composition eﬀect. It is positive if managers
can employ a higher number of production workers and negative in the opposite case,
whereby the strength of the composition eﬀect depends on the initial degree of asymme-
try. a) For an increase in production labor, the terms of trade eﬀect is negative, but
is always dominated by a positive productivity eﬀect. b) For an increase in managerial
labor, the terms of trade eﬀect is positive. The productivity eﬀect vanishes. In either
case the overall eﬀect is ambiguous.
All of these relative wage eﬀects may be interpreted as relative welfare eﬀects for
the respective group of workers, provided that trade in ﬁnal goods is free and costless,
as assumed. Consumers in both countries then pay identical prices for ﬁnal goods, and
they also face the same degree of variety. However, one needs to be cautious when
considering real wage eﬀects. Two additional channels need to be taken into account
for real wages. The ﬁrst is a change in variety that follows from any change a country’s
endowment with managers; see the managerial labor market equilibrium condition (1)
above. With “love for variety”, such changes are of direct relevance for real wages.
The second channel runs through ﬁnal goods prices, which are related to marginal cost
through a constant markup. From (2), marginal costs in the home and the foreign
economy are related to endowment changes according to
b ~ c = ^ w   ^ L=(1   ) and b ~ c

=  ^ L
=(1   ) (19)
Based on these considerations, it is relatively straightforward to extend the above
analysis to real wages. We leave this to the reader.
3 Trade in production tasks
Remember that w=A(nx) and w=A(nx) is the cost of performing a unit-level of any
task, respectively, in the home and the foreign economy. If a task is concentrated for
the entire world in the home economy, the cost is equal to w=A(nx + nx), if it is
concentrated in the foreign economy, then the cost is equal to w=A(nx+nx). How-
ever, performing a certain task i in a diﬀerent country from where a ﬁrm’s headquarter
is located, then the amount of labor required is larger than in the case of domestic
13performance by a factor t(i). We assume that the additional labor required is labor
from the country where the task is located, not where the headquarter is located. This
formulation is completely analogous to the familiar “iceberg cost” of transport. Natu-
rally, we have t(i)  1, and we order tasks according to the ease with which they can
be dislocated, whence t0(i) > 0. Moreover, we normalize t(0) = 1.
Intra-ﬁrm task trade: We ﬁrst look at cases where all task trade takes place within
a ﬁrm’s boundary, meaning that a ﬁnal goods producer does not consider performing
tasks for other ﬁnal goods producers, or outsourcing a certain task to be done by
another ﬁrm. Moreover, we ﬁrst look at equilibria where a location decision by any
one ﬁrm is matched by the same decision of all other ﬁrms headquartered in the same
country. Outsourcing and deviant behavior across ﬁrms will be considered below.
As a ﬁrst step we address the border line between tasks that may be concentrated
in either the home or the foreign economy. Obviously, it is tasks with low i-values that





then task i is a candidate for concentrated performance in the home economy. Foreign
ﬁrms would ﬁnd no incentive to relocate this task back to their headquarters. Given






implicitly determines a cut-oﬀ-value I, separating tasks i < I that may in equilibrium
be concentrated in the home economy from those that may either be concentrated in
the foreign economy, or else not be concentrated in any country, but performed where
the respective ﬁrm’s headquarter is located. A corresponding condition identiﬁes tasks






Obviously, if the two countries are completely symmetric, then I = I. Countries
may be asymmetric either in absolute size, or in their relative endowments. Intuitively,
a larger country should have a larger range of tasks that it may end up performing
for the entire world. On the other hand, a higher endowment with managers relative
to simple labor has an ambiguous eﬀect. Other things equal, it increases the num-
ber of ﬁrms headquartered there, which contributes to its size advantage, but it also
tends to increase the equilibrium wage paid to simple labor, which reduces its cost
competitiveness.
14The pattern of task specialization supported by this type of coordinated location
decisions is ambiguous. For tasks i < min(I;I) equilibrium requires concentration of
a task in either the home or the foreign country. Tasks i > max(I;I) will be located
at the respective ﬁrms’ headquarter location. If I < I, then tasks indexed i 2 [I;I]
are concentrated in the home country, and conversely for i 2 [I;I] if I < I.
Outsourcing and deviant behavior: Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg (2010b) show
that this indeterminacy of equilibrium task location is reduced, if one allows for single
ﬁrms to perform tasks for others. When considering where to locate a certain task, a
ﬁrm may then invest in the capacity of becoming an attractive outsourcing partner for
other ﬁrms. Whereas in the equilibrium considered above tasks are never traded across
ﬁrms, although potentially located oﬀshore, we now have tasks being contracted out to
independent suppliers. This raises two issues. First, since ﬁrms produce diﬀerent vari-
eties, tasks may be speciﬁc to varieties and, thus, relationship-speciﬁc. As emphasized
by Antràs (2003) and Antràs & Helpman (2004), this may generate a holdup problem,
if complete and enforceable contracts cannot be written. For the sake of simplicity, we
rule this out.
The second issue relates to pricing. If a ﬁrm expects other ﬁrms to make similar
location decisions regarding the capacity to perform certain tasks, then a reasonable
assumption is that they charge prices equal to costs of serving other ﬁrms, inclusive
of the cost for oﬀshore provision of tasks. However, a ﬁrm may also consider a single,
isolated deviation from a common location decision. For instance, if a common deci-
sion to locate capacity for some task i in the home economy is an equilibrium in the
sense described above, a ﬁrm may consider the proﬁt potential of an isolated deviation
strategy, setting up task-i capacity in the foreign economy and trying to attract all
demand for this task through outsourcing relationships. Such a deviant ﬁrm is then
assumed to set diﬀerent prices to diﬀerent buyers, depending on whether the buyer’s
own capacity of task performance is oﬀshore, or sited at its headquarter location. By
construction of the argument, they all have their own capacity of task provision in the
same location. But for some of them that will be an oﬀshore location, which allows
the deviant ﬁrm to charge them a higher price. We follow Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg
(2010b) in assuming that a potential deviant charges task-prices just an " below the
respective buyer’s cost of in-house provision, given the buyer’s own task location. This
price discrimination is possible, because tasks are speciﬁc to the ﬁnal goods.
Allowing for such outsourcing relationships, we may reinterpret the condition (21)
above as separating tasks i < I, where a common decision to place task performance in
the home economy is immune to what Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg (2010b) call local
deviation, from the rest where task concentration is subject to a deviation threat. By
local deviation we mean a foreign ﬁrm deviating from this common choice of location
by placing its task capacity in the foreign economy, hoping to make a proﬁt through
15serving only foreign ﬁrms from a foreign base, thus saving on oﬀshoring cost. It would
have a per unit cost equal to w=A(nx), thus forgoing global scale, but would be
able to charge a price just below wt(i)=A(nx + nx), which is what foreign ﬁrms
have to pay when procuring task i from oﬀshore (i.e., the home economy). A similar
reinterpretation for a world with outsourcing relationships obtains for I as deﬁned in
(22) above. The above ranges of task concentration thus receive further substantiation
through allowing for contractual outsourcing.
But deviation may take a second form, where the deviant ﬁrm tries to attract task
demand from the entire world. Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg (2010b) call this global
deviation. Suppose, again, that all ﬁrms have to locate their capacity of performing
a certain task i < min(I;I) in the home economy. With intra-ﬁrm task oﬀshoring,
home ﬁrms would then obtain these tasks for a “price” equal to w=A(nx+nx), while
foreign ﬁrms have bear the dislocation cost t(i) and, thus, pay a “price” equal to
t(i)w=A(nx + nx). Now consider a deviant ﬁrm setting up task-i capacity in the
foreign economy and trying to make a proﬁt by selling this task for just an " below these
prices to the two types of ﬁrms. If successful in attracting the entire world demand
for this task, the deviant would have production costs equal to w=A(nx + nx) plus
oﬀshoring costs. She would have the advantage of being able to sell to foreign ﬁrms at a
price t(i)w=A(nx+nx) ", and to home ﬁrms at a price equal to w=A(nx+nx) ".
Obviously, whether this generates a positive proﬁt depends on the diﬀerence in the wage
gap w   w and on the size of the two countries, measured through nx and nx. In
turn, the wage gap depends on both, country size and relative endowments.
Given the aforementioned price discrimination, a deviant ﬁrm’s total revenues from
selling task i is equal to w[nx + t(i)nx]=A(nx + nx).12 The deviant ﬁrm’s own
aggregate cost in the outsourcing case (inclusive of the oﬀshoring cost) would be equal
to w [nx + t(i)nx]=A(nx + nx). Hence, the proﬁt from a deviation strategy,
relative to a concentration of any task i < min(I;I) in the home economy, emerges as
d(i) :=
w[nx + t(i)nx]   w [nx + t(i)nx]
A(nx + nx)
(23)
If this proﬁt from deviation is negative, then a concentrated location of task i in the
home economy is the only equilibrium. If d(i) > 0, then a deviation strategy would
ultimately lead to an equilibrium where all ﬁrms locate task i in the foreign economy
and where no contractual outsourcing actually takes place. We may now deﬁne a task
J that yields a zero proﬁt for the deviant ﬁrm, which means d(J) = 0. This condition












12To be precise, revenues are an " below this magnitude.
16Task trade with identical relative endowments: Suppose there is a solution to
(25) with J 2 ]0;1[. As we will show below, this is only possible in the case with
identical relative endowments as in Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg (2010b). Suppose,
moreover, that J < min(I;I). This cut-oﬀ value separates tasks with positive devi-
ation proﬁts from those with negative deviation proﬁts. Then, the right-hand side of
(25) must have equal signs for the denominator and the numerator. If it is negative,
essentially meaning that the home economy is larger than the foreign economy, then
it must be true that d(i) > 0 for i < J, and conversely for i > J. In the opposite
case of a relatively smaller home economy, the deviant’s proﬁt is positive for i > J and
negative for i < J.
Let us look at the ﬁrst of these cases where the home economy is relatively large.
Obviously, for tasks i > J and i < min(I;I), meeting world-wide demand for the task
from concentrating all capacity in the home economy is immune to global deviation via
outsourcing. The same is not true for tasks i < J. But let us assume that ﬁrms can
relocate their own production capacity at no cost. Then any attempt by the deviant
with a foreign production base to charge foreign ﬁrms a price above here own task cost
w=A(nx+nx) would be futile, since these ﬁrms would then be prompted to relocate
to a foreign production base. The important point to bear in mind here is that these
ﬁrms would fully beneﬁt from size advantage, if that advantage is external to the ﬁrm
as assumed. Consequently, the deviant’s positive proﬁt would then rely in charging
home ﬁrms a price above t(i)w=A(nx+nx). But again, such an attempt would be
frustrated by home ﬁrms shifting their production base for task i to the smaller foreign
economy.
Hence, global deviation from coordinated concentration of tasks i < J in the end
does not lead to any outsourcing.13 What it does, instead, is tie down the location of
tasks i < J to the smaller of the two countries, which in our argument is the foreign
economy, and of tasks i > J and i < min(I;I) in the home economy. It is relatively
obvious that a perfectly analogous reasoning leads to concentration of all tasks i > J
and i < min(I;I) in the foreign economy, provided that it is the larger of the two
economies. For tasks i > min(I;I), the equilibrium allocation of task capacity will
be in the home economy, if I < I, and vice versa. And for tasks i above max(I;I),
decentralized location of task performance is the only equilibrium outcome, as we have
seen above. The remaining question now is what happens if J > min(I;I). Suppose
that I < I, eﬀectively meaning that the home economy is relatively small. Then, by
the above logic we have tasks i > J and i < I concentrated in the foreign economy,
and all tasks i < min(I;I) - and thus i < J - we have a safe concentration of tasks in
the (smaller) home economy. But suppose, instead, that I < I.
We are now able to fully describe the pattern of task trade between two countries
13More precisely, ﬁnal goods producers are indiﬀerent between in-house procurement of tasks and
outsourcing, but the location of task capacity is unambiguous.
17that diﬀer only in size. We have ﬁve diﬀerent possibilities separated by whether I > I
or I < I and by whether or not J < min(I;I). In all of these cases, tasks with low
oﬀshoring costs are concentrated in the low-wage country which is also the smaller of
the two countries. Tasks with intermediate oﬀshoring costs are concentrated in the
larger country high-wage country. And tasks at the upper end of the scale of oﬀshoring
costs are performed in a decentralized way, with each ﬁrm locating its task capacity in
its headquarter country. However note that each of these sets of tasks might be empty.
Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg (2010b) show that wages and aggregate output always
go hand in hand. In other words, the high-wage country will always have a higher
aggregate output than the low-wage country. Intuitively, for most parameter values,
the country that is endowed with a higher amount of both factors of production will
obtain a higher aggregate output. However, with low oﬀshoring costs and the two
countries being suﬃciently equal three equilibria are possible, the second equilibrium
having the country that is endowed with less of both production factors achieving a
higher aggregate output and therefore a higher wage for production workers, while in
the third equilibrium both countries have an equal aggregate output, equal wage and
the oﬀshoring structure cannot be determined.
Task trade with diﬀerent relative endowments: In the asymmetric case we
assume that both countries are of equal size. Size in this context has to be measured
by the amount of task i performance for home and foreign ﬁrms respectively, which
is equivalent to aggregate output. This can be written as nx = nx. We do this to
isolate the eﬀect of relative endowment diﬀerences and changes thereof on the oﬀshoring
equilibrium. This assumption also improves the analytic tractability of our result.
It can easily be seen that with nx = nx the right-hand side of equation (25)
reduces to  1 and therefore no solution exists for J 2 ]0;1[. This means that global
deviation is possible for the whole range of tasks when they are concentrated ex ante in
the high-wage country, and no global deviation is possible when tasks are concentrated
ex ante in the low wage country. Additionally, for w 6= w, the marginal tasks I and I
will always be in the same order. This implies that in equilibrium only one oﬀshoring
pattern is possible. Tasks with low oﬀshoring costs end up concentrated in the low-
wage country while tasks with high oﬀshoring costs are performed dispersedly in both
countries. In analogy to Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg (2010b) it is now possible to
prove that relative factor endowments and production workers’ wages always go hand
in hand. The country with a higher relative endowment with managers always has a
higher wage for its production workers. We state this result in the following proposition
Proposition 3 (Production wages and factor abundance). In two countries of identical
size nx = nx, w  w if and only if M
L > M
L
A proof is oﬀered in the appendix. The intuition is as follows. In this model, tasks that
18might be performed oﬀshore only require production labor. However, by assumption
production workers are equally productive in both countries. With very low oﬀshoring
costs and wages “almost” equal the external economies of scale lead to a situation
where, in principle, concentration of tasks in both countries is possible. But as we
know that in the home economy production labor is relatively scarce, the equalization
of production workers’ wages is only possible if there is at least one task concentrated
in the foreign country. In addition, we know that with unequal wages the marginal
tasks I, I, and J are always in an order such that only oﬀshoring is possible only in
one direction. This, in turn, implies oﬀshoring from the high-wage-country towards the
low-wage country. Summarizing this intuition, we can conclude that, with M
L > M
L
and w 6= w, it must be true that w > w. However we cannot rule out a possible
equilibrium with w = w, which implies I = I and equal aggregate production cost
in both countries. This means that oﬀshoring in both directions might take place and
no structure is imposed on the sets of tasks that are concentrated in the two countries.
In such a case we only know that the set concentrated in the foreign country must be
larger than the set of tasks concentrated in the home country, but we cannot determine
the exact oﬀshoring pattern.
Some analytical results: The possibility of oﬀshoring modiﬁes some of the equa-
tions in the model. As shown above, tasks can now be grouped into three sets. Those
tasks concentrated in the home economy, those concentrated in the foreign country,
and those performed domestically by ﬁrms in both countries. These three sets have to
be considered when calculating marginal production costs as
c =
wQ(H)
(nx + nx) +
wT(F)
(nx + nx) +
wQ(B)
(nx) (26)




(nx + nx) +
wQ(F)
(nx + nx) +
wQ(B)
(nx) (27)
for the foreign country where H is the set of tasks concentrated in the home country,
F is the set of tasks concentrated in the foreign country, and B is the set of tasks
performed in both countries. Q(:) is a Lebesgue measure for the set of tasks and T(:)
is the same measure inclusive of oﬀshoring costs.
Analogously, production workers can be working in three diﬀerent occupations.
Performing tasks that are concentrated domestically for domestic ﬁrms, performing
tasks that are concentrated domestically for ﬁrms from the other country, and per-
forming tasks for domestic ﬁrms that are performed in both countries. The new full
19employment conditions can therefore be written as
L =
nxQ(H)
(nx + nx) +
nxT(H)
(nx + nx) +
nxQ(B)
(nx) (28)




(nx + nx) +
nxQ(F)
(nx + nx) +
nxQ(B)
(nx) (29)
for foreign production workers.
From the equilibrium condition of the managerial salary s = cx=f(  1) it is then













Note that this is not a general equilibrium result, since production volumes, number of
varieties and oﬀshoring volumes are all determined endogenously, however, it already
gives interesting insight into the distributional mechanisms between the to types of
labor. Compared to the non-oﬀshoring case in equation (13), home managers can
increase their wage bill if there is a substantial amount of domestic tasks oﬀshored to
the foreign economy, whereas their wage bill is reduced if foreign tasks are oﬀshored to
the home economy and performed by home production workers. The total oﬀshore labor
employment is weighted by the wage paid to oﬀshore labor. This is very intuitive since
concentration of production in a country means that less domestic workers perform
manufacturing tasks for domestic managers and output per manager declines.









This means that the aggregate wage bill in the two countries still remains in the same
proportions as in the case with no oﬀshoring. One implication thereof is that in the
case with symmetric endowments, a rising managerial wage premium in one country
always has to be paralleled by a falling managerial wage premium in the other country.
We summarize these results in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 (Oﬀshoring and within-country inequality). a) Everything else equal,
concentration of tasks in the home economy decreases the domestic managerial wage
premium. This eﬀect is the larger, the higher the wage of domestic workers and the
larger the foreign economy. Conversely, concentration of tasks in the foreign economy
increases the domestic wage premium. A corresponding relationship holds for man-
agers in the foreign country. b) In the presence of oﬀshoring the distribution between
managers and workers in the aggregate of the two countries is the same as the one that
20obtains for each country individually in an equilibrium where oﬀshoring is ruled out.
For identical relative endowments a rising managerial wage premium in one country
must thus be accompanied by a falling wage premium in the other.
4 Simulation Results
There are two reasons to use simulation methods in this context. First, as Grossman
& Rossi-Hansberg (2010b) point out, the equilibrium parameter values depend on inte-
grals over the set of tasks concentrated in each economy or performed in both countries.
But these sets themselves are functions of the parameters in question. Furthermore the
external nature of the economies of scale might give rise to multiple equilibria. This
implies only little scope for analytical tractability. An additional beneﬁt of the nu-
merical simulation is that it allows us to highlight non-monotonic outcomes regarding
the oﬀshoring pattern and wage payments. In the following we illustrate some results
obtained by a numerical simulation of the model.
We choose parameter values so as to ensure comparability with Grossman & Rossi-
Hansberg (2010b). Oﬀshoring cost is linear with t(i) = i + 1 and the external scale
economy takes the form [X(i)]
 with  = 0:8, while f = 1 and  = 2. Grossman &
Rossi-Hansberg (2010b) demonstrate that the choice of  = 2 implies for the symmetric
case oﬀshoring in both directions whenever there is oﬀshoring. As we show in section
2 this choice has the additional advantage of yielding equal remuneration for managers
and workers in the symmetric case whenever there is no oﬀshoring.
We analyze inequality in two dimensions: Inequality between countries, measured
by income per capita, and inequality within countries measured by the managerial
wage premium. For each of these dimensions we diﬀerentiate between two cases: First,
we have a look at a symmetric case where relative endowments are the same in both
countries. We following Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg (2010b) in assuming M=L =
M=L = 0:5, with a world endowment equal to M + M = 2 and L + L = 2, and
in looking at cases where the home economy is larger, i.e., M = L > M = L.
Secondly, we analyze the asymmetric case, whereby we assume the home economy to
be abundantly endowed with managers, meaning M=L > M=L. In this asymmetric
case, we sharpen our focus on the relative endowment by shutting down the country
size channel through the assumption nx = nx.
214.1 Cross-country Inequality
We measure inequality between the two countries by the ratio of incomes per head,




where w = 1 through choice of the numéraire, and M is the share of managers in the
home economy, with L = 1   M;and analogously for the foreign economy. For the




First we turn to the results of the symmetric case. Figure 1 depicts international
inequality for varying degrees of size advantage as well as varying amounts of oﬀ-
shoring, driven by underlying values of  which measures the costliness of trade in
tasks. The ﬁgure clearly indicates that in the absence of relative endowment diﬀerences
the economies of scale work to the beneﬁt of both types of labor in the large country. A
further general insight is that for very similar countries oﬀshoring has a very moderate
eﬀect on the relative incomes per capita. For example, with M = L = 1:01 a jump
from zero oﬀshoring to complete specialization in tasks increases the gap in the average
wage from 1:05 to a mere 1:14.
For larger diﬀerences, however, the average income gap is highest for medium levels
of oﬀshoring. This means that very high and very low levels of oﬀshoring work to the
beneﬁt of the smaller (poorer) country. For instance, with an endowment of M = L =
1:1 and oﬀshoring autarky the wage gap is 1:5. Opening up to oﬀshoring it reaches
its maximum of 1:55 at an oﬀshoring volume of 0:2 and subsequently declines until it
reaches 1:24 at the point of complete specialization in tasks.
The intuition for this non-monotonicity is as follows. For low levels of oﬀshoring, the
home country beneﬁts more from the ﬁrst tasks moved to the respective other country,
since tasks with low oﬀshoring costs are concentrated in the small country while tasks
with higher oﬀshoring costs are concentrated in the large country, so that the large
country has to spend less on transport costs. This eﬀect is further strengthened since
it is obvious that even though oﬀshoring in both directions occurs, a higher share of
tasks is concentrated in the large country than in the small country. This means that
production workers’ productivity in the large country rises more than in the small
country, due to the scale eﬀect. At the other extreme, if there already is a substantial
amount of infra-marginal tasks to be aﬀected, a further decrease in the oﬀshoring costs
that induces a higher level of oﬀshoring brings more beneﬁts to the small country.
Small-country producers save on transport costs for the high share of tasks already
concentrated in the large country. Also, these are the more costly tasks to oﬀshore,







































































































23not beneﬁt as much, since less tasks are concentrated in the small country.
It can be shown that in an equilibrium without oﬀshoring, the relative average wage
is identical to the inverse of the relative production cost for the varieties of the two
countries. As the oﬀshoring volume increases this relationship break down since more
and more foreign production workers are employed in manufacturing of home goods,
and vice versa.
There is a small caveat though: Imagine both countries to be of relative similar
size and globalization having gone very far, meaning a high volume of oﬀshoring. This
case, which corresponds to parameter values in the south of the white line, implies
the possibility of multiple equilibria and the larger country may end up producing less
aggregate output and having a lower average wage. We generally restrict our ﬁgures
to only depict the equilibrium where the larger country produces a higher aggregate
output and has higher wages.
Now let us move on to the asymmetric case where the home country is relatively
manager-abundant while the foreign country is abundantly endowed with production
workers. Note that this puts it at a disadvantage for hosting concentration of tasks.
The case is depicted in ﬁgure 2. Opening up to oﬀshoring now gives rise to a diﬀerent
pattern of task trade in that oﬀshoring only takes place in one direction. When the
ﬁrst tasks are concentrated in the country which is abundant in production workers, it
is the workers there who beneﬁt from an increase in productivity and wages. However,
when more oﬀshoring is induced though a fall in oﬀshoring costs, this pattern changes.
Decreasing oﬀshoring costs for infra-marginal tasks only work to the beneﬁt of the
manager-abundant country, so that with more and more specialization it can achieve
an ever higher average wage.
A further, more subtle insight is that the disadvantage from a relatively low endow-
ment with production labor is the larger, the more extreme the relative distribution
of factors is. This is due to the fact that the income distribution within this country
changes more rapidly in favor of the factor that becomes increasingly scarce than does
the income distribution within the production-labor-abundant country.
In this speciﬁcation again, we have to consider a caveat. For very similar coun-
tries and high levels of oﬀshoring home production workers, although being the scarce
production factor, can even end up with the same wage as their foreign counterparts,
which implies I = I. In such an equilibrium, up to a cutoﬀ task C, oﬀshoring of
some tasks from the home to the foreign economy equalizes wages in both countries.
However, the set of tasks that yields equal wages when performed oﬀshore in the for-
eign country might be smaller than the set of tasks for which oﬀshoring is feasible as
implied by I and I. If this is the case, then for all tasks i with C < i  I = I there
is nothing in the model to determine the location of production. We only know that





































































































25this set is larger than the set of tasks concentrated in the home economy. Since this
indeterminacy has an inﬂuence on wages and salaries due to the diﬀering oﬀshoring
costs, we do not report results for the parameter values for which this indeterminacy
arises.
4.2 Within-country inequality
In this section we investigate the eﬀect of country size and endowment ratios on man-
agerial wage premia in the two countries. We report results for the home economy,
assumed to be the large country in the symmetric case and the manager-abundant
country in the asymmetric case. Again, ﬁrst we have a look at the symmetric case.
As above, in ﬁgure 3 the parameter combinations for which a second equilibrium
with higher wages in the small country might occur is indicated by a white line. How-
ever, we ignore this possibility for now. From a rapid glance at the ﬁgure we readily
learn two things. Generally, a more disparate endowment of labor between the two
countries appears to work in favor of production workers. However, this eﬀect is neg-
ligible for very small volumes of oﬀshoring. This is due to the fact that – keeping the
overall oﬀshoring volume constant – a more disparate distribution means that less tasks
are concentrated in the small country, and more tasks in the large country. This im-
plies that in the large economy more workers perform concentrated high-productivity
tasks which means that their wage rises. Intuitively, the higher the oﬀshoring volume,
the stronger this productivity increase due to concentration and the stronger this wage
eﬀect.
Second, we see that higher levels of oﬀshoring work in favor of managers. The eﬀect
is smaller for highly unequal endowments. This is because higher levels of oﬀshoring
imply a higher productivity and a higher output for each ﬁxed manager input. Work-
ers’ wages rise due to the increased productivity in tasks concentrated domestically.
However, managers’ salaries move proportionally with output, which is an increasing
function of the total volume of oﬀshoring and therefore rises even faster and leads to
an increase in the managerial wage premium. Clearly, if the home country is larger,
a larger share of total oﬀshoring is concentrated there so that workers beneﬁt almost
as much as managers, and the increase in the managerial wage premium is less pro-
nounced.
A closer look reveals that complete specialization entails the highest managerial
wage premium only for medium values of relative country size, at about M = L = 1:15.
For more unequal countries the maximum manager premium occurs with an oﬀshoring
volume of about 0.75, while for more equal countries it heavily depends on the exact
level of country size. In the asymmetric case we can identify a similar pattern of the
managerial wage premium in the manager-abundant country. Intuitively, for any level













































































































































































































28fect on their income. As above, an increase in the oﬀshoring volume has a positive eﬀect
on the managerial wage premium. Clearly, since oﬀshoring now implies concentration
of tasks only in the economy with a higher relative endowment of production labor,
home workers do not become more productive. However, home managers beneﬁt from
the increased productivity of their ﬁrms due to the oﬀshoring possibility and receive
higher salaries. In contrast to the above case, the rising managerial wage premium due
to globalization is thus independent of the factor endowments.
Comparing the size of these two channels, it is intuitive that oﬀshoring in the
asymmetric setup has a larger eﬀect than with symmetric countries. In the asymmetric
case, moving from no oﬀshoring to a high levels of oﬀshoring while holding endowments
ﬁxed can increase the managerial wage premium by a factor of around 2:5. In the
symmetric case, moving from no oﬀshoring to a substantial amount of oﬀshoring only
increases the premium by a much lower factor of 1:05.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have argued that wage and inequality eﬀects of trade should be ad-
dressed focusing on the distinction between managerial and production workers. For
a large part, managerial labor is a ﬁxed input in production, while production work
serves as a variable input. A key tenet of our analysis is that this asymmetry impor-
tantly shapes the determination of managerial salaries and production wages. A second
fundamental assumption underlying our analysis is that production labor often bene-
ﬁts from local spill-over eﬀects related to narrowly deﬁned tasks along complex value
added chains, and that modern technology of communication and transport increas-
ingly makes such tasks tradable. This installs a rationale for concentrating performance
of single tasks in single countries, using countries’ endowments with production work-
ers, and to exchange the performance of such tasks across ﬁrms with headquarters
located in diﬀerent countries, depending on their endowment with managerial labor.
This is an instance of trade based on “Marshallian” economies of scale.
We have used a 2-country model of such task trade recently developed by Grossman
& Rossi-Hansberg (2010b), in order to address inequality both within and between
countries. Our analysis has focused on the role of country size and relative endowments
with managerial and production workers, respectively, on the managerial wage premium
as well as on income per capita in one country relative to the other. We have also
compared these eﬀects in a world with trade only in diﬀerentiated ﬁnal goods, with a
world where there is trade in tasks governed by varying degrees of trade costs.
We have ﬁrst presented a number of analytical results. For instance, in a world
without trade in tasks, we can neatly identify three diﬀerent channels through which
country endowments aﬀect international inequality: There is a terms of trade eﬀect,
29but also a productivity eﬀect of countries becoming larger. In addition, there is a
composition eﬀect if endowments change in an asymmetric fashion.
Trade in tasks between symmetric countries is mostly two-way in nature, with
small and large countries concentrating on diﬀerent subsets of tasks. We have shown
that task trade between asymmetric countries is typically one-way in nature, whereby
the production-worker-abundant economy exports task performance against imports
of diﬀerentiated ﬁnal goods. A further analytical result states that countries of equal
size will have diﬀerent wages for production workers in line with standard intuition
from endowment-based models of comparative advantage, meaning that a larger rel-
ative endowment with production workers necessarily means lower production wages,
notwithstanding the scope for productivity eﬀects deriving from task specialization
based on scale economies. Moreover, concentration of tasks in a certain country always
works against managerial wages in that country.
These analytical results have been complemented by numerical simulations that
highlight certain non-monotonicities as well as orders of magnitude. An interesting
non-monotonicity arises for international inequality between diﬀerently sized countries
that are symmetrically endowed with managers and workers. Starting out from low
levels of oﬀshoring, a reduction in the cost of task trade tends to generate gains mainly
for the large country, while the opposite is true once these cost fall below a certain
threshold. A similar non-monotonicity arises in the asymmetric case, where for low
levels of oﬀshoring it is the country with more production workers that reaps the bulk
of globalization gains, while manager-abundant economies beneﬁt once globalization
as gone suﬃciently far.
An interesting result regarding orders of magnitude relates to how the managerial
wage premium is aﬀected by oﬀshoring. If oﬀshoring takes place in a ““north-north”
fashion”, i.e., between countries with symmetric endowments with managers and work-
ers, then a jump from very low to very high levels of oﬀshoring, measured as the
percentage of tasks concentrated in a single country, has a moderate positive eﬀect on
the wage premium in the vicinity of 5 percent. It is, however, much more severely af-
fected if this same change takes place for task trade between countries with asymmetric
factor endowments where the managerial wage premium increases by as much as 150
percent. Of course, these are numbers pertaining to a highly stylized model and should
not, therefore, be taken literally. Overall, however, our analysis clearly demonstrates
that task trade among similar and asymmetric countries is likely to have diﬀerential
wage eﬀects for managers and workers that have so far not received suﬃcient attention
in the literature.
30Appendix
Proof of proposition 3. With the deﬁnitions of I and I in equations (22) and (21),
nx = nx and w > w imply that I > I. This means that the oﬀshoring equilibrium
will necessarily have tasks [0;I] concentrated in the foreign country, whereas tasks
(I;1] will be performed in both countries. Therefore, the full employment condition
for production workers in the home economy from equation (28) implies





Equation (29) can now be reduced to give an equation for full employment of production
workers in the foreign economy as
L





 nx + nx
A(nx + nx)
(35)
due to iceberg oﬀshoring cost T(I) > I. Full employment of high-skilled managers
in both countries gives







L is equivalent to H
H > L
L.
We proof the proposition by establish a contradiction. Suppose H
H > L
L . Then,inserting




(1   I) nx
A(nx) + I nx+nx
A(nx+nx)
(1   I) nx
A(nx)
: (38)
From the assumption of nx = nx, it follows that n
n = x
x. Inserting this and trans-
forming the right-hand side gives
x
x > 1 +
I 2nx
A(2nx)
(1   I) nx
A(nx)
> 1 (39)
Inspecting production cost in equation (26) it is easy to determine that the marginal








w(1   I)A(nx + nx) + wT(I)A(nx)
A(nx)A(nx + nx)
(40)









w(1   I)A(nx + nx) + wIA(nx)
A(nx)A(nx + nx)
(41)
With nx = nx and w > w, and since T(I) > I, this implies
c
c =
w(1   I)A(2nx) + wT(I)A(nx)
w(1   I)A(2nx) + wIA(nx)
> 1 (42)
Finally we remember equation (3), relating the relative price of two varieties to the













we arrive at a contradiction, since c
c > 1 in equation (42) and x
x < 1 in equation
(39).
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